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EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION FOR ATYPICAL WORKERS:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2006 ANNUAL MEETING,
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS SECTION ON
LABOR RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Professor Katherine Van Wezel Stone*: I want to welcome all of
you to the annual session of the Labor Relations and Employment
Law Section of the AALS. The program today is on employment
protection for atypical workers.
We often focus our research, and our teaching on what we think
of as typical employees, employees who have a steady attachment to a
conventional employer or firm, and we focus on what kinds of legal
protections they have in that situation. But as we all know from our
research as well as from reading the newspapers every day, there is an
explosion of new kinds of workers in employment relationships that
do not fall within the normal employee category. Whether they are
contingent workers, leased workers, agency temporary workers, or
dependent/independent contractors, there are many kinds of people
performing work at the low end of the labor market who do not fit
into the conventional definitions of employee and therefore are not
entitled to the normal range of protections that we teach and write
about. So today's session is designed to raise the question of what
kinds of protections and legal regulations are there for atypical
employees, and how might we think about their employment
regulatory needs.
I will introduce all the speakers now so we can move along. First
is George Gonos, who is a Professor of Economics and Employment
Relations at the State University of New York at Potsdam. He is
going to talk about the evolution of law of temporary work. The
second speaker is Steve Befort, who is the Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty
& Bennett Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law
School. He teaches labor, employment, disability, and public sector
labor law courses, and he will speak about the regulatory void of
contingent work. The third and final speaker is Michelle Travis, from
the University of San Francisco Law School. She teaches employment
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law.
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law, employment discrimination, torts and remedies, and she will talk
about full-time, face-time norm lessons from the United Kingdom. So
we start now with George.
Professor George Gonos*: The title of my presentation is
"Evolution of the Law on Temporary Work in America."
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, we have seen the steady decline of trade unions
and the New Deal model of employment, and the concomitant rise of
"contingent labor." These developments are two sides of a single
dynamic process. A new labor landscape has come into being, and
around it a new legal regime has stealthily come into effect - though
one molded not by labor upsurge, which had produced the New Deal
paradigm, but by the upsurge of business. Kathy Stone spoke of this
emerging regulatory regime some time ago, in her article on "The
Legacy of Industrial Pluralism," in which she noted that the
expansion of individual employment rights was not simply an
accretion to the New Deal system of collective bargaining, but was in
some ways undermining it.'
A prominent feature of this new labor landscape is the
resurgence of what would have been known a century ago as feecharging employment agencies, and what are now called temporary
help and staffing firms, payrolling services, employment leasing
businesses, executive search firms, and PEOs (professional employer
organizations). Not coincidentally, the progenitor of all of these kinds
of commercial staffing businesses, the temporary help industry, was
founded in 1947, the same year that the Taft-Hartley amendments
weakened the position of organized labor. The rise of temporary
work and the decline of unions have proceeded hand in hand ever
since, slowly and almost imperceptibly for a while, and then picking
up great speed.
In most accounts, the growth of "atypical" or "non-standard"
forms of employment is seen as the natural and inevitable result of
global market imperatives that have necessitated their use by business
managers. My research tends to refute this idea by investigating the
* Professor, Department of Economics and Employment Relations, State University of
New York at Potsdam.
1. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between
Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 575, 575-76 (1992).
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central role of political power and crafty lawmaking in the
institutionalization of "atypical" forms of employment - for instance,
the specific role of business lobbies, courts, state legislatures, and
government administrative bodies in ratifying as legal and legitimate
the particular version of "temporary work" that the for-profit temp
industry promotes. I focus, in other words, on the subterranean
movements of a shadow system of deformalized law, and exactly how
it came into being. My conclusion is that temporary work and other
forms of "contingent work" as we know them are not the result of
inexorable economic forces, but rather of the mobilization of wellorganized political forces.
In the 1950s, the young temporary help industry claimed that
temp firms were a "new type of service." In fact, the temp industry
represented a revival of the seamy old private employment agency
business that flourished in the unregulated labor markets of the late
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. During that era, millions
of temp workers - transients, floaters, hoboes, or bindlestiffs
crisscrossed America in search of their next job. Engaged in building
the nation's infrastructure, they were miserably exploited by
thousands of established private agencies and by smaller fly-by-night
feeder operations and padrones of every ethnic type. Private agencies
also thrived in the domestic, clerical and professional sectors, a scene
strikingly similar to what we see today. The federal Commission on
Industrial Relations concluded in 1916 that the business "as a whole
reeks with fraud, extortion and flagrant abuses of every kind."'
For employers, hiring through intermediaries and forming an
ongoing triangular employment relationship with one or more
agencies served the same functions it does today: weakening the
employer's attachment to his workers and rendering them more easily
disposable, thereby facilitating numerical flexibility - the ability to
expand and reduce the size of one's workforce quickly, in rhythm
with the swings of an uncertain economy. Artificially shortening work
assignments was profitable for both employers and employment
agents. It kept wages low, precluded labor organization, and
2. See George Gonos, The Contest Over "Employer" Status in the Post-War United States:
The Case of Temporary Help Firms, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 81, 94-100 (1997) [hereinafter
Gonos, Contest Over "Employer" Status]; see generally George Gonos, Fee Splitting Revisited:
Concealing Surplus Value in the Temporary Employment Relationship, 29 POL. & Soc'Y 589
(2001) [hereinafter Gonos, Fee Splitting Revisited].
3. See Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 602 (1917) (citing Final Report and Testimony
submitted to Congress by the Commission on Industrial Relations created by the Act of August
23, 1912, 64th Cong. 1st Sess., Doc. 415, vol. I, pp. 109-11, vol. II, pp. 1165-1440).
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multiplied the fees to be collected and then divided between the
employer and agent in a practice called fee-splitting.The
quintessential application of this principle was the "three gang
system": having one group of workers on the job, another on its way
from the agency, and a third group returning to the agency to be
rehired and sent back, after paying another fee.4 With this system, the
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) said, employers had
perfected what no scientist or engineer had yet been able to invent: a
perpetual motion machine.! The IWW was the one labor organization
that directly challenged this "vampire system." 6 In 1909, it led a
boycott of "shark agencies" in Spokane and sought to establish unionrun employment offices as an alternative.
Progressives in the American Association for Labor Legislation,
and a couple of incredible women out of the University of Chicago
Sociology Department and associates of Hull House, championed the
cause for state regulation of the employment agency business. A
regulatory regime came into being relatively quickly. By 1914, twentyfive states had detailed employment agency laws on the books. These
laws placed ceilings on agency fees and required that records be kept
open to inspection. Sixteen types of fraud were outlawed, including,
for example, misleading advertisements and charges for "extra
services." Fee-splitting was eventually outlawed in twenty-one states.
But this loose patchwork of state and municipal regulation was
clearly inadequate, and, of course, the Lochner-era U.S. Supreme
Court blocked the most far-reaching measures.9 The IWW's famous
campaign in Spokane had led to passage of a popular referendum in
Washington State that effectively abolished agencies that charged
workers a fee. But in Adams v. Tanner,'0 the Supreme Court nullified
the law on the basis that it unconstitutionally deprived employment

4. Harris Freeman & George Gonos, Regulating the Employment Sharks:
Reconceptualizing the Legal Status of the Commercial Temp Agency, 8 WORKING USA: J. LAB.
& Soc'y 293, 297-98 (2005) (citing George Gonos, Never a Fee! The Miracle of the Postmodern
Temporary Help and Staffing Agency, 4 WORKING USA: J. LAB. & SOC'Y 9 (2000)).

5. Id. at 298.
6. Id. The term "vampire system," is not used in this article but comes from Adams, 244
U.S. at 604.
7. Freeman & Gonos, supra note 4, at 298 (citing PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: VOL. 4, THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE
WORLD 1905-1919, at 177-85 (1965)).

8. Gonos, Fee Splitting Revisited, supra note 2, at 593.
9. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1343-73 (3d ed. 2000).
10. 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
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agency operators of their liberty and livelihoods." In Ribnick v.
McBride,1 the high court declared that the regulation of agency fees
was an unconstitutional form of price fixing.
2

II.

AGENCY WORKERS AND THE

NEW

DEAL

-

Interestingly, the monumental changes in the legal environment
brought about by the New Deal left temp workers in much the same
condition as before. The Wagner Act, passed in 1935,13 was primarily
concerned with equalizing the relationship between employers,
employees, and labor organizations, and contained nothing on private
employment agencies, viewing them as labor market "neutrals."
Thus, agency workers were left in what a congressional investigation
at the time referred to as a "no-man's land," pointing to and
portending what Stephen Befort calls the rapidly expanding "black
hole" that workers are being pulled into today.14 In 1941, a federal bill
finally emerged that would regulate private employment agents under
the U.S. Department of Labor (something that Progressives had
advocated since before World War I). But due in part to the U.S.
entrance into World War II, this effort to regulate employment
agencies at the national level - an attempt to fill that black hole
failed. To this day, no federal law defines or regulates for-profit
employment agencies.
During the New Deal period, the maturation of Fordist
production methods, along with employers' use of internal labor
markets as a means of recruiting and retaining workers, diminished
the role of the private employment agency business. At the same
time, the state-level regime of regulation put in place by Progressives
early in the Twentieth Century was strengthened by the vigilance of
state regulators operating in the pro-regulatory mind-set of that
period. In 1941, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively overturned the
1928 Ribnick decision and allowed states once again to set ceilings on
agency fees." Thus, when temp firms appeared in the immediate postWorld War II period, they were confronted by the relatively strict
11. Adams, 244 U.S. at 596-97.
12. 277 U.S. 350, 358 (1928).
13. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151- 69 (2000)).
14. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A HistoricalReview
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV 351 (2002); see also Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the
Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent
Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2003).
15. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
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enforcement of state employment agency laws.
Temp firms utilized the triangular employment relationship in
the same manner and for the same purposes that it had been used at
the turn of the Twentieth Century. One major aspect of their legal
environment had changed since then, however. The burden of
obligations and restrictions that came attached to "employer" status
had been increased and codified by New Deal labor law: National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),"
Social Security Act," Davis-Bacon Act,19 etc. From the 1960s onward,
these obligations would further increase with passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,20 the age and disability discrimination acts,21 and
the growing exceptions to the at-will rule allowed by state courts. If
the modern temp firm was to provide the same protections to
employers as its forebears in the old employment agency business - if
it was going to shield its clients from these increased obligations
then temp firms would need (at least nominally) to take the role of
"employers" themselves. In business magazines like Fortune, this is
what (in coded language) they promised to do.22
While "assigning" workers to their client firms, temp firms
simultaneously placed these workers for legal purposes on their own
payrolls and staked their claim as their legal employers, even as their
client firms directly supervised the work and utilized the labor power
provided. In this arrangement, temp firms bill their clients (user
firms) an amount covering wages, overhead (including employment
taxes) and profits, and issue paychecks to temp workers after
deducting their fees. Temp firms thus maintain a tie to these workers,
as their nominal "employer," whether the workers' employment with
a particular client (or several different clients) lasts a few days,
16. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
USC §H 151- 69 (2000)).
17. Federal Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000).
18. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
19. Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-48 (2000). The Davis-Bacon Act was passed on
March 3, 1931; and thus was technically pre-New Deal.
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 2000a through 2000h-6 (2000)).
21. Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (2000)).
22. "Renting" Workers to Industry, FORTUNE, Sept. 1960, at 254,259-60, 264.
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several months, or many years, profiting from the arrangement every
hour that work is being performed.
This formula posed a serious legal issue, of course. The claim
that temp firms were bona fide independent employers was (and is)
contradicted by long-standing legal assumptions. The most important
factor in determining employer status, the right of control exercised
over the work, is typically non-existent in the case of the temp agency.
It is the client or user firm that exercises direct control over the means
and manner of work. Also problematic was the fact that "temporary
help service firms" (as they liked to be called) fit the states'
definitions of "employment agency" to a tee. Thus, in a simple
application of long-standing statutes, state regulators regarded temp
firms as employment agencies and subjected them to appropriate
regulation. In New Jersey, for instance, inspectors issued complaints
against agencies that did not post fee schedules "in a conspicuous
manner" in their offices,23 a rule that the temp industry despised. If
the temp industry was to be successful in shielding employers from
various kinds of obligations to "temp" workers, it would have to
reshape the legal and regulatory environment to be consistent with its
own definition of the situation.
In the mid-1950s, Manpower, Inc., an industry leader, brought
suit against several states, challenging the regulation of their offices as
employment agencies. Manpower's claim that temp firms were not
employment agencies but "a new type of service" was rejected in two
of three states in which the cases were heard.24 Into the 1960s, there
continued to be a great deal of resistance by state and federal
regulators to the temp industry's claims. These rebuffs led the
National Association of Temporary Services (NATS) to pursue a
political strategy in the state legislatures. NATS mobilized a
protracted campaign with political, legal, and public relations aspects.
Year after year, bills crafted by industry attorneys designed to exempt
temp firms from coverage under employment agency laws and to
define them as statutory employers were introduced into state
legislatures. Largely unopposed, and without any public hearings, the
23. The requirement to post a schedule of fees "in a conspicuous manner in the office of
the Agency" was added to New Jersey's employment agency law in 1928. See N.J.L. 1928, ch.

283, § 5(a). Temporary help firms were exempted from this requirement in 1981 N.J.L. ch. 1.
24. Florida Indus. Comm'n v. Manpower, Inc. of Miami, 91 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 1956)
("Manpower is not an 'employment agency' in the sense in which the term is commonly and
generally understood."); State ex rel. Weasmer v. Manpower of Omaha, 161 Neb. 387, 394 (Neb.

1955); Manpower, Inc. of New Jersey v. Richman, No. L-22576-56 (Super. Ct. Essex Cty., N.J.
June 24, 1957).
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temp industry managed to steer its amendments of state employment
agency laws through weak business-oriented state legislatures, or to
induce state attorneys general to issue favorable administrative
orders. By 1971, all but two states had made accommodations with
the industry's position.2 5 In this manner, the temp agency, an
institution never considered by either law or popular wisdom to have
fulfilled the social function of employer, achieved that status
politically, and escaped the regulations under which its predecessors
had operated.
A new era of unregulated labor brokering was launched. Aided
by the economic recession associated with the first "oil shock," the
temp industry experienced its first real "boom" in 1973, and has
grown in starts with each successive economic cycle since. As their
status as "employers" became institutionalized in practice, temp firms
were widely and effectively used to sever the employee-employer
relationship between temp workers and the firms for which they
provided labor, allowing user firms to avoid most of the legal, social
and contractual obligations they held toward direct employees. Even
as the realm of employee rights was expanding in the 1980s and 1990s,
the proportion of workers who could make use of these rights vis-Avis the company they worked for was shrinking.
With the new rules in place, employers found it easy to
manipulate appearances, at least well enough to pass scrutiny in the
newly loosened regulatory environment. It became something like a
"shell game." Claims brought by long-term staffing agency workers
against employers like ARCO and SmithKline Beecham (now
GlaxoSmithKline) revealed stories of "temps" who worked for those
firms for years without company benefits while they were shifted
around to the payrolls of several different staffing agencies. At
Microsoft, it was the worker's badge color that designated one's
status as a regular vested employee or a disenfranchised "nonemployee." A new form of discrimination was added to the stock
types of race, gender, and ethnic discrimination, based on the simple
labeling of some workers as "leased," "contracted," or "temp"
employees. "Payrolling," the rerouting of a worker's paycheck
27

25. See Gonos, Contest Over "Employer" Status, supra note 2, at 94-5.
26. Thomas v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 773 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Casey v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. Capital Accumulation Plan II, No. CV-99-06437-LGB, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6836 (C.D. Cal. 2000), rev'd, No. 00-55671, 21 Fed. Appx. 727, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
24134 (9th Cir. 2001).
27. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1019 (1997).
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through an outside agency, proved in practice to be sufficient to avoid
many of an employer's legal obligations.
Temp and staffing agencies thus provided a means of creating a
secondary labor market within virtually every company and
occupational group, and this greatly facilitated the growing corporate
use of the core-and-periphery or split workforce strategy. In 1973, this
strategy was sanctioned by the NLRB in Greenhoot, Inc. Despite the
similarity of work performed by regular and "temp" employees,
workers supplied by labor-only staffing agencies were now
understood as comprising a separate and distinct unit. This Board
doctrine, which viewed the typical staffing agency situation as a multiemployer unit, made it virtually impossible in the last quarter of the
Twentieth Century for temps to organize or join existing bargaining
units at their place of work.
Another fascinating example of how the temp industry managed
to reshape its legal environment involved the definition of agency
"fee." From its beginning, the temp industry has advertised that it
charges no fees to workers. This spurious claim rests, once again, on
changes in state laws quietly won by the industry through its
aggressive lobbying efforts. Early in the Twentieth Century, the legal
definition of employment agency fee included, in addition to any
amount charged up-front, the agent's mark-up, that is, the difference
between what the agent charged its business client for supplying
workers and the amount it paid those workers. But this language was
elided from state laws at the instigation of the temp industry. The
agency's mark-up, which can be exorbitant, is now considered
confidential business information and is the "best kept secret" in the
staffing industry. From the mid-1970s to the early-1990s, the temp
industry managed to redefine agency fees as exempt from oversight if
they were said to be "client paid," that is, if they were invisible to
workers. The "no fees" claim is merely a sleight of hand. In a new
brand of fee-splitting, temp workers' wages are set in private
negotiations between private staffing firms and their business clients.
The so-called "cost savings," achieved by eliminating benefits and
reducing wages, are shared or split between the agency and user firm.
29

28. 205 N.L.R.B. 250 (1973). The decision in Greenhoot, Inc. was reaffirmed in Lee Optical,
300 N.L.R.B. 947, but this line of cases was overturned in 2000 in M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B.
1298 (2000). M.B. Sturgis was then overturned in Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 76,
2004 WL 2681621 (2004).
29. Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. at 251. As a multi-employer bargaining unit, the
employees could be considered one unit only if both employers consented. Id.
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III. DEFORMALIZED LAW

I want to characterize what has occurred over the last several
decades as the "deformalization" of employment agency law. Half a
century ago, Max Weber's seminal ideas in the sociology of law were
first brought together and published under the auspices of the host of
this meeting, the Association of American Law Schools.3 0 Weber put
forward a typology of legal thought and championed what he called
"formal rationality." 3' To Weber, law is rational when the means for
settling disputes are governed by systematic, logical, and internally
consistent rules, and controlled by the intellect.32 He derided
irrationallaw that is not guided by general principles and substantive
law, which is influenced by ideologies external to the law itself and
oriented toward the achievement of particular objectives, most often
those of powerful groups.34 Since the 1960s, I would suggest, with the
legal developments outlined above, the law of private employment
agencies has moved away from formal rationality and taken a sharp
turn toward the substantive and irrational. For its part, the temporary
help industry has never shrunk from skirting the law, basing its
behavior, in Veblen's memorable phrase, on "the sane presumption"
that "the courts will be wise enough to see that the law is not allowed
to apply with such effect as to impede the volume or narrow the
margins of business-as-usual."
The temp agency's de facto status as an independent employer,
achieved by political fiat and without benefit of rational judicial
review, remains as legally tenuous as ever, and the battle over it
continues, both in the U.S. and abroad. A number of important
decisions have seemed to undermine this status, yet they have had
little or no effect on the staffing industry's practices. M.B. Sturgis3 6
involved the typical staffing arrangement. The temps supplied by an
outside agency performed the same work and were subject to the
same user-firm supervision as the company's unionized employees,
30. MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed.,
Edward Shills & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954).
31. See generally id.
32. Id. at 1, 61-64.
33. Id. at xlvii-lx, 61-64, 256-83.
34. Id. at 1, 61-64, 224-55.
35. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT
TIMES 157-58 (1923).
36. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), overruled, Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 2004
WL 2681621 (2004).
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yet they received lower compensation and fewer benefits. In a major
setback for the staffing industry's position, the NLRB found that "all
the employees [both unionized and temp] in fact share the same
employer, that is, the user employer,"3 7 and concluded that staffing
agencies are not "independent employers."" Yet, a demoralized labor
movement decided not to utilize the precedent aggressively, and its
self-defeating prediction that the precedent would quickly be
overturned by the Bush Board came true in 2004 with the ruling in
Oakwood Care Center.39
IV. LEGAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM

The multifarious abuses fostered by the commercial staffing
business - abuses not only of individual workers but also of public
policies and programs such as workers' compensation - has led to
various efforts to re-regulate the industry. Many of these are
piecemeal initiatives aimed at eliminating specific practices, such as
making charges to workers for transportation or for cashing their
paychecks. Harris Freeman of the Western New England College of
Law and I have developed the following proposals to incorporate the
regulation of for-profit staffing agencies into federal labor law.40
These proposed reforms involve adding to the NLRA a definition of
for-profit staffing agencies, to identify them as entities distinct from
employers,4 1 and amending the law to impose on commercial staffing
agencies a legal duty to fully inform and fairly represent the workers
they deploy (analogous to the duty of fair representation imposed on
unions by the NLRA). 42
Finally, we propose that in order to level the playing field on
which for-profit staffing agencies and labor unions operate, section
8(f) of the LMRA should be reformed to allow pre-hire agreements
for all private sector unions." Currently, commercial staffing agencies
routinely enter into pre-hire agreements with client firms and very
often enforce what are in effect "closed shop" arrangements. The
current application of the NLRA, which turns a blind eye to these
43

37. M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1305.
38. Id.
39. 343 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 2004 WL 2681621 (2004).
40. See generally Freeman & Gonos, supra note 4.

41. Id. at 310.
42. Id. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
43. 29 U.S.C. §158(f) (2000).
44. Freeman & Gonos, supra note 4, at 310.
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staffing industry practices, actually privileges for-profit agencies over
unions and worker-operated hiring halls, as the latter are not
permitted the same prerogatives. As Kathy Stone suggests in From
Widgets to Digits, the ban on closed shops should be lifted to create a
modicum of parity with the manner in which the commercial staffing
industry currently negotiates its hiring agreements with employers.45
Quite obviously, legal and legislative work alone will not bring
about the changes that the American workforce desperately needs. A
well-coordinated labor organizing effort that combines unionized
workers with the massive numbers of contingent and "atypical"
workers will be necessary. The doors of the house of labor must be
opened wide to allow entry of these masses - the details to be sorted
out later. Within this larger organizational plan, legal advocacy and
litigation must be strategically utilized - and the need will be great.
One final point: high mobility labor markets are not the problem.
The point is achieving flexibility with fairness. Consider the odd fact
that none of the numerous books and surveys on "contingent
workers" mention those workers employed through union hiring halls
as illustrative of that category, though in fact they are. This, of course,
is because unionized workers in the construction or maritime
industries - despite the fact that their employment relationships are
casual and "contingent" - have achieved through the hiring hall
model a level of income, benefits, job security, and rights that are
characteristic of workers in the so-called "core" or primary market. In
short, these "atypical" workers have managed to organize themselves
effectively to gain bargaining leverage and spread work more fairly.
Studying the legal and historical underpinnings of atypical
employment makes it clear that alternative forms of workforce
flexibility that do not exacerbate economic insecurity or widen the
gap between rich and poor are politically and economically possible.

45. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 227 (2004).
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Professor Stephen F. Befort*: The title of my presentation is
"The Regulatory Void of Contingent Work."4 6
I. INTRODUCTION

A significant shift has occurred in the nature of American work
relationships. Long-term employment constituted the predominant
model of structuring work relationships well into the latter part of the
twentieth century. Beginning in the 1970s, U.S. employers began to
adopt a variety of practices designed to facilitate the capability of
responding quickly to changes in market forces.47 The hypercompetition of the global economy provided a powerful incentive for
this development, while information and communications technology
made new "contingent work" arrangements more feasible.
This increase in more flexible work arrangements, however,
comes with a number of problems. The most significant is the creation
of a veritable regulation-free zone in portions of the contingent work
landscape. During my time, I would like briefly to lay out this
problem and to offer three suggestions for addressing this growing
regulatory black hole.
II. THE CONTINGENT WORKFORCE
A. The Bygone Era of Long-term Employment

For much of the last century, the predominant employment
model in the United States could be described as that of a "core
worker system,"
characterized
by long-term employment
48
relationships. Rather than periodically bidding for workers in
external markets, employers looked within their organizations for a
dependable supply of labor. In fostering these internal labor markets,
employers adopted personnel policies that included such features as
competitive wage rates, training, and internal lines of progression.
The most important of these policies was a managerial
* Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School.
46. This presentation was adapted, in part, from Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black
Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historicaland Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work,
24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2003).
47. Id. at 154.
48. See RICHARD S. BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE
TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE 12 (1989).
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commitment to long-term job security. By 1950, most American
employers accepted the principle that employees should be
discharged only for just cause.49 In the unionized sector, which
composed 31.5 percent of the nonagricultural workforce in 1950,so the
just cause principle generally was legally compelled by the terms of
collective bargaining agreements. In the nonunion sector, employers
generally adhered to this practice through an implicit rather than an
explicit understanding with their employees." Thus, internal labor
markets fostered the development of a social contract in which both
employers and employees possessed legitimate expectations of a longterm relationship.52
B. The Rise of the Contingent Workforce
Today, in contrast, a large and growing group of workers provide
labor or services based on a variety of arrangements that deviate from
the traditional core worker model. It is helpful to think of these
contingent workers in terms of two broad categories. One group,
consisting of independent contractors, contracted workers, and leased
employees, are not legally classified as employees of the entity for
whom they provide services. The second group, consisting of parttime and temporary employees, have the legal status of employees,
but with a lessened degree of attachment to the workplace as
compared to traditional "core" employees.
While the exact number of contingent workers in the U.S.
economy is uncertain and varies by definition, reliable estimates
range upwards to 20-30 percent of all American workers.53 The
proportion of contingent workers, moreover, is undoubtedly
growing. 54
While a diverse group in some respects, contingent workers share
49. See SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1900-1945, at 269 (1985).
50. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 1980b 412, tbl. 165, reprintedin
MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10, tbl. 1
(1987).
51.

See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the

Changing Workforce for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 523 (2001).
52.

See PETER CAPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 200-01 (1997); JACOBY, supra note 49,

at 269.
53. STANLEY NOLLEN & HELEN AXEL, MANAGING CONTINGENT WORKERS 9-10 (1996);
Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?,

22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557, 564 (1996).
54.

See Befort, supra note 46, at 158.
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several common characteristics. First, contingent workers tend to
have a weak affiliation with their workplace." In contrast to "core"
employees, these workers typically are not considered a part of the
corporate family and experience greater periods of unemployment.
Second, although certainly not a universal characteristic, contingent
workers often receive less in pay and benefits than do traditional
employees.5 6 The benefit shortfall is particularly notable with respect
to health care insurance. Finally, many contingent workers have not
voluntarily chosen their work status. Some studies indicate that as
many as 60 percent of temporary employees and 25 percent of parttime employees would prefer more traditional full-time jobs."
C. Reasons for the Growth in ContingentWork Arrangements
Why the dramatic growth in these short-term arrangements?
First and foremost, it is good for business. Many firms see contingent
work arrangements as a means to maximize labor mark flexibility. In
the increasingly global economy, companies experience the pressure
of severe fluctuations in the need for labor." Contingent workers aid
managerial flexibility by enabling companies to adjust personnel
needs while avoiding the expense of cyclical hiring and lay-offs.60
Firms expand their workforce by hiring contingent workers in boom
times to supplement their complement of core workers, and then let
the contingent workers go when cycles turn downward.
Three additional factors also contribute to this increase in
contingent work. First, many workers also find contingent work
arrangements desirable. This is particularly so for those workers
seeking to balance work and family responsibilities, and for those
with special skill sets such as many in the technology field.62 Second,
advances in information and communication technology increasingly
enable firms to structure work in ways that alter the traditional
55. Id. at 159.
56. Id.
57. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 571 n.13 (1997).

58. See Arne L. Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and Workers in the United States: Correlates
and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 771, 772 (1995).
59. See NOLLEN & AXEL, supra note 53, at 22.
60. See Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Case Against Regulating the Market for Contingent
Employment, 52 WASH & LEE L. REV. 849,858 (1995).
61. See, SAMUEL ESTREICHER & STEWART SCHWAB, FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 (2000).
62. See NOLLEN & AXEL, supra note 53, at 23.
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location and the timing of work activities.
Finally, American businesses have powerful legal and financial
incentives to increase their use of contingent workers, especially for
those contingent workers who fall outside of the legal definition of an
"employee."64 Most statutes governing the workplace only apply
within the context of the employment relationship. While an
employer must comply with the legal mandates of such statutes as
Title VII65 and the Fair Labor Standards Act,66 for example, these
statutes are inapplicable to non-employee workers such as
independent contractors, contracted workers, and leased workers."
As a result, many firms consciously attempt to structure work
relationships in a manner that will avoid "employee" status and its
accompanying legal strictures.68
Firms also can garner cost savings through the use of contingent
workers. Business entities are responsible for payroll taxes as well as
contributions
for
unemployment
insurance
and
workers
compensation plans only for their employees. This expense,
accordingly, may be avoided for those employees who are replaced by
non-employee contingent workers. Moreover, firms tend to provide
contingent workers with lower pay and benefits.69 Although this latter
attribute is not legally compelled, many companies view core
employee status as a convenient and defensible eligibility threshold
for conferring premium pay and benefits.

III. THE REGULATORY VOID

While employers reap many benefits from this greater labor
market flexibility, the increase in contingent work arrangements has
come with several problems for employees and unions, including

63. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 78 (4th ed. 1998).
64. See Befort, supra note 46 at 162-63.

65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000).
67. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting Labor and
Employment Law to the Rise of the Contingent Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 882
(1995) ( stating that "under our social welfare system, the receipt of statutory protection nor
benefits is dependent on a person meeting the definition of employee under the relevant
statute").
68. See Befort, supra note 46, at 162-63.

69. See Karst, supra note 57, at 571 n.11 (noting that the average hourly wage for
temporary employees in 1994 was 35 percent lower than it was for full time employees); id. at
571 n.13 ("Since 1990, the nation's mostly female temp force has mushroomed more than 85
percent. Yet only 8 percent of temps receive health benefits . . . .").

2006]

PROTECTIONFOR ATYPICAL WORKERS

249

decreased pay, benefits, training, and job tenure. The most significant
problem, however, is the fact that many of these workers fall outside
of the regulatory safety net constructed for the employment
relationship. This regulatory void occurs primarily for three reasons.
A. Threshold JurisdictionalRequirements
First, many employment statutes, contain threshold jurisdictional
requirements that exempt certain types of workers and employers
from the scope of coverage. Some employment statutes only apply to
employees who have attained a certain level of workplace attachment
with a particular employer. Further, several statutes only apply to
employers having a minimum number of employees. The Family and
Medical Leave Act, for example, applies only to employers having
fifty or more employees and guarantees leave time only to employees
who have worked for the same employer for at least one year and for
at least 1,250 hours during the previous twelve-month period.70 Many
contingent workers fail to meet these threshold jurisdictional
requirements.
B. The Definition of Covered "Employment"
Second, and more significantly, American labor and employment
regulations invariably extend only to "employees." Given the
restrictive tests to determine employee status, many contingent
workers fall outside of the zone of statutory coverage.
The most frequently used touchstone for ascertaining employee
status is the common law agency test. This test primarily focuses on
the employer's right to control not only the result accomplished by
the work, but also the details and means by which that result is
accomplished.' If such a right to control is found to exist, the worker
is deemed to be an employee. In the absence of such a right to
control, the worker is classified as an independent contractor and
exempt from the coverage of labor and employment regulation.
A somewhat more inclusive "economic realities" test is used to
determine employee status under the Fair Labor Standards Act.72 A

70. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A), (4)(A) (2000).
71. The multi-factor formula of the common law test is set out in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
72. See, e.g., Johnson v. Unified Gov't of Wyandott County, 371 F.3d 723, 729 (10th Cir.
2004).
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Department of Labor opinion letter summarized this approach,
stating that "an employee, as distinguished from a person who is
engaged as a business of his own, is one who, as a matter of economic
reality follows the usual path of an employee and is dependent on the
business for which he serves."73 During the 1970s and 1980s, many
federal courts of appeal adopted a "hybrid" test for determining
employee status under federal discrimination statutes which combines
elements of both the common law and economic realities test.74
Despite the growing popularity of the hybrid test, the Supreme
Court reinvigorated the common law standard in its 1992 decision in
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden." In that case, the Court
rejected the use of an economic realities test under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act, suggesting that this broader
standard was limited in application to the unique statutory
formulation of the FLSA." The Court instead adopted a thirteenfactor formulation of the common law test.7 ' The Darden decision has
led many courts to replace the hybrid test with the common law test
in ascertaining employee status under other statutes. 79
The restrictive Darden test is problematic for several reasons.
For one thing, the test sets an unpredictable standard. Any formula
with thirteen variables is bound to have considerable play in the
joints. And, as the Microsoft Corporation learned, mistaken
assumptions about employee status can entail potentially costly
80
consequences.
The Darden test also is prone to entrepreneurial manipulation.
As the final report of President Clinton's blue-ribbon Dunlop
Commission noted, the common law test provides employers with
both "a means and incentive to circumvent the employment policies
73. Wage & Hour Opinion Letter No. 832 (June 25, 1968).
74. See Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38
B.C. L. REV. 239, 250 (1997).
75. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
76. 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1461 (2000).
77. 503 U.S. at 325-26.
78. Id. at 323-24.
79. See Maltby & Yamada, supra note 74, at 253; see also Lamberten v. Utah Dep't of
Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1996) (favoring common law test for Title VII claim);
Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting the common law test for ADEA
claim).
80. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that a
group of workers erroneously classified by Microsoft as independent contractors may be eligible
as employees to participate in the company's pension plans).
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of the nation."" The incentive, of course, is to avoid the costs and loss
of flexibility associated with governmental regulation. The means is to
structure work arrangements so that workers fall on the nonemployee side of the Dardendivide.
The Title VII sex discrimination claim of Patricia Knight
provides an example of the policy shortcomings of the common law
test.8 2 Knight worked as an insurance agent selling Farm Bureau
Insurance Company policies. Farm Bureau trained Knight in the art
of insurance sales and assigned her to a designated sales territory. It
provided her with an office, a secretary, and a computer. Farm
Bureau required her to be present in the office during three specified
periods each week and to retrieve mail and messages on a daily basis.
Farm Bureau gave Knight written performance standards which were
backed up by periodic evaluations. And, her contract with Farm
Bureau prohibited Knight from selling the insurance products of any
other company.83 Knight sued Farm Bureau claiming that she had
been sexually harassed by a Farm Bureau supervisor. The district
court, after a two-day bench trial, found substantial evidence to
support that claim. Nonetheless, the court dismissed Knight's claim
because Farm Bureau did not control the intricacies of "the manner
and means by which she sold insurance."" The Seventh Circuit
affirmed on the ground that the trial court's findings were not clearly
erroneous." In short, the courts determined that a full-time worker
who suffered sexual harassment at the hands of her only supervisor
was beyond the reach of our protective social legislation.
C. The Labor Law Void
A third source of this regulatory void occurs in the field of labor
law. Union density has declined precipitously in the United States
during the past few decades. In 1954, union membership peaked at
34.7 percent of the non-agricultural labor force" and then began a
long and tortuous decline. Data for 2005 shows union membership at

81. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMISSION ON
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 38 (1994).
82.
83.
84.
85.

Knight v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 378.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 381.

86. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., supra note 50, at 412, tbl. 165, reprinted in GOLDFIELD, supra note

50, at 10, tbl. 1.
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just 12.5 percent of the nonagricultural labor force."
Contingent work arrangements contribute to union decline in
several ways. First, as noted previously, many contingent workers are
not employees or, at least, not employees of the entity for whom they
provide work. As such, these workers are not covered by the NLRA
and are not protected against discharge or other retaliatory acts in
seeking to join a union. Second, part-time and temporary workers,
even though legally classified as employees, commonly are excluded
from bargaining units on the grounds that they do not share a
sufficient community of interests with more permanent employees.
Third, as the National Labor Relations Board recently reaffirmed in
its Oakwood Care Center decision, workers who are leased from a
supplier firm and who work alongside regular employees may not be
included in a bargaining unit with the user firm's employees without
the consent of both joint employers.'8 Since one or both of these
employers invariably withhold consent,89 these workers are effectively
denied the right to seek union representation.
IV. THREE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
What should be the proper legal response to this regulatory
void? Two insights offer some initial guidance.
First, it is clear that powerful forces have contributed to the rise
in contingent work, including global economic competition, altered
family-work arrangements, and technological advances. The
entrepreneurial drive toward flexible employment practices is a
world-wide phenomenon that is not likely to wane in the foreseeable
future. Given the historical march of these trends, it would be
impractical either to prohibit contingent work arrangements or to
regulate such practices to the point of inflexibility.
Second, the growth of nonstandard work arrangements has
skewed the reach of protective social legislation pertaining to
economically dependent workers. Traditionally, these protections
extended to employees, who were deemed to be dependent upon a
particular employer, but not to independent contractors, who were
87. U.S.

DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, PRESS RELEASE: UNION

MEMBERS SUMMARY (Jan. 20, 2006), available at <http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/union
2.nr0.htm> (last viewed Apr. 29, 2006).
88. Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 2004 WL 2681621 (2004).
89. See Bita Rahebi, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Board's Treatment of
Temporary Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1105, 1124

(2000).
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thought of as autonomous entrepreneurs rolling the dice for
themselves and not in need of regulatory intervention. Today,
however, many contract and leased workers work side-by-side with
more traditional employees and, regardless of nomenclature, share an
economic dependence upon a single user entity. Since the demand for
flexible work arrangements has driven a wedge between law and
reality, perhaps the jurisdictional boundaries of these statutes should
be redrawn in order to serve the "socioeconomic purposes"90 of our
most basic workplace laws. Toward this end, I suggest three basic
legal reforms.
A. Expanding the Reach of Employment ProtectionStatutes

'

First, the coverage of employment protection statutes should be
expanded beyond the common law definition of an "employee" to
more broadly encompass workers who labor under subordinate
circumstances.
The Dunlop Commission's proposed solution was to adopt a
unitary "economic realities" test for defining employee status. The
Commission's final report recommended that the determination of
whether someone is an employee for purposes of employment
protection statutes "should not be based on the degree of immediate
control the employer exercises over the worker, but rather on the
underlying economic realities of the relationship." 9
While the Commission's recommendation certainly would
improve on the current common law approach, it falls short of an
ideal solution. As with the common law standard, the economic
realities test also consists of a multi-factor formula in which the right
to control the manner of work is a significant factor. As demonstrated
by Professor Marc Linder, the federal courts increasingly have
interpreted the economic realities test in a manner that is more
restrictive than its ostensible purpose would suggest.92 As a result, a
considerable segment of workers are deemed not to be covered
employees even though they are economically dependent upon a
particular user entity.
A comparative view offers the prospect for a preferable solution.

&

90. See Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law:
an Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L.
POL'Y J. 187, 187 (1999).
91. See U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., supra note 81, at 38.
92. See Linder, supra note 90, at 207-09.
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The rise in contingent work is a global phenomenon, and many
countries have sought legislative solutions for its accompanying
problems. An approach that a number of countries have adopted is to
recognize a third category of workers that falls in between that of
employees and independent contractors. These "dependent
contractors"93 technically are not employees under the traditional
legal tests, but nonetheless are recognized as deserving of some
employee-like legal protections by virtue of working in positions of
economic dependence.94 Employment protection laws in countries
such as Canada, Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands treat
dependent contractors similar to employees for some purposes, but
not for others.
Many Canadian jurisdictions, for example, have adopted
provisions that treat "dependent contractors" as employees for
purposes of collective bargaining. Ontario's Labour Relations Act
provides a useful definition of a covered "dependent contractor" as:
a person, whether or not employed under a contract of
employment . . who performs work or services for another person
for compensation or reward on such terms and conditions that the
dependent contractor is in a position of economic dependence
upon, and under an obligation to perform duties for, that person
more closely resembling the relationship of an employee than that
of an independent contractor.9 5
Germany's practice with regard to this middle category of
workers probably provides the approach most worthy of emulation.
There, an intermediate group of "employee-like persons" are
technically self-employed, yet nonetheless are treated as employees
for some purposes because they are "economically dependent and are
in similar need of social protection."96 Thus, employee-like persons
are covered by statutes relating to workplace health and safety, the
prevention of sexual harassment, and collective bargaining. On the
other hand, these dependent contractors are not covered by
Germany's Act on Protection against Dismissals and the Act on
Working Time. This dichotomy apparently reflects the notion that
statutory coverage should be broader where basic societal interests
93. See Harry W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor:A Study of the Legal Problems of
CountervailingPower, 16 TORONTO L.J. 89 (1965).
94. See Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent
Contractors:A View from Canada, 21 CoMp. LAB. & POL'Y J. 7,24-25 (1999).
95. Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O Ch. 1, sched. A., § 80 (1995).
96. See Wolfgang Daubler, Working People in Germany, 21 COMP. LAB. & POL'Y J. 77, 88
(1999).
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are at stake than where the interests in question relate more narrowly
to the status of an individual worker.
The United States should follow this example and extend the
reach of employee protection statutes that serve core societal goals to
contractors who are economically dependent on a user firm. Antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII fall within this category. The
eradication of discrimination is a well-recognized societal goal, and it
would not unduly distort labor market competition to extend the antidiscrimination ban to this group of workers. The same is true for
broadening the reach of the NLRA and the Occupational Health and
Safety Act.
B. Enhancing the Option of Collective Bargainingfor Leased
Employees
An expansion in the definition of a covered dependent worker
for NLRA purposes, however, is insufficient by itself to facilitate the
free choice objective of that statute when it comes to leased
employees. In this context, the NLRB's traditional approach to union
organizing initiatives should be reformed to permit jointly-employed
contingent workers a fair shot at exercising the option of union
representation.
It is not uncommon in today's economy for a company to have
workers leased from a temporary services company working side-byside with the regular employees of the user company. Yet, while the
regular employees can decide for themselves whether to develop a
collective bargaining relationship with their employer, the leased
workers can join in that bargaining unit only with the consent of both
joint employers - the supplier lessor company and the user lessee
company. The reason for this result is that the NLRB has treated this
situation as a variant of multi-employer bargaining where it
necessarily follows that a union cannot expand a bargaining unit to
encompass another employer's employees without the consent of that
other employer. 7 Such consent hardly ever occurs,98 with the result
that the only viable union option for leased employees is to attempt
to organize the dispersed workers of the leasing company, a daunting
task, indeed.
97. See Lee Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. 947, 948 (1990).
98. See Rahebi, supra note 89, at 1124 (referring to an interview with former Board
Chairman William Gould during which he reportedly "remarked that he had not heard of a case
to date in which the [leased] employees had obtained the consent of both employers.").
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The problem with the multi-employer analogy is that, in many
leased employee contexts, the user firm is not some outside entity,
but instead, an employer of both employee groups. The user entity,
along with a supplier entity, are considered to be joint employers of
the leased workers if the two entities share or co-determine matters
governing the workers' terms and conditions of employment.99
Because of this fact, the Board in its 2000 Sturgis decision declined to
accept the "faulty logic" of prior decisions and ruled that a unit
composed of employees who are jointly employed by a supplier
employer and a user employer, as well as employees who are solely
employed by the user entity, is permissible so long as the two groups
share a sufficient community of interests."0 This result is sound as a
matter of policy since eliminating the dual consent prerequisite to a
combined unit offers the only realistic prospect of meaningful choice
in union representation for leased employees. Unfortunately, the
Board reversed itself in its 2004 Oakwood Care Center decision. 0 ' As
a second reform proposal, I believe that the Board should re-adopt its
more flexible Sturgis approach.
C. Enhancing the Portabilityof Benefits
Finally, workplace laws should enable employee benefits to
become more portable. This can be accomplished by linking benefits
with workers and their careers rather than with a particular
employing entity. The current federal COBRA'02 and HIPAA'0 o
statutes provide examples of such an approach.
Policies should be adopted to facilitate the portability of other
benefits as well. As an example, Congress could amend ERISA to
provide that employees who work for more than one employer may
accumulate periods of service to meet the minimum vesting period for
pension plans. Similarly, state unemployment compensation laws
could be altered to permit more employees who work at part-time
and temporary positions to qualify for some proportion of
unemployment benefits. In both situations, the cost of providing these
benefits could be prorated among the various employing entities.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
(2000).

See Riverdale Nursing Home, 317 N.L.R.B. 881, 882 (1995).
M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1305 (2000).
Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 76,2004 WL 2681621 (2004).
Consolidated Ominibus Budget Reduction Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-69 (2000).
Health Insurance Privacy, Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-91(c)
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Unions also might find it advantageous to take a leadership role
in facilitating more portable benefits. With job control unionism on
the wane, unions would do well to consider developing into
''organizations that provide a career-based source of health insurance
and pension coverage as well as training, information-sharing and
placement services for mobile workers."" This new type of craftunionism could represent employees by occupation rather than by
worksite and bargain with industry-wide or regional employer groups
to set minimum labor standards for employees who move between
employers in the industry. Such a transformation might reshape
unions into institutions that accommodate rather than resist the
ongoing drive for flexible labor practices.
IV. CONCLUSION

I would like to conclude by echoing George's observation that
the current proliferation of contingent work arrangements resembles
those of a century earlier. I think that this, in fact, is part of a more
sweeping similarity between the two eras. At the beginning of the
Twentieth Century, changes in trade and technology transformed
economic markets from local to regional in nature. Capitol became
more mobile than labor in this environment, resulting in a heightened
inequilibrium in the fortunes of employers and workers.m This
imbalance persisted until the federal New Deal legislation ultimately
forged a new equilibrium.
Today, changes in trade and technology have enhanced capitol
mobility in a global economy and again skewed the relative fortunes
of employers and workers. Is a continued regulatory race to the
bottom in the pursuit of "flexibility" inevitable? Or, will a TwentyFirst Century New Deal eventually arise to structure a new
equilibrium? If so, I suggest that such a reordering likely is possible
only on some international or global basis.
Professor Michelle A. Travis*: The title of my presentation is
"The Full-Time Face-Time Norm: Lessons from the United
Kingdom." 106 In this presentation, I would like to discuss the legal
104. Samuel Estreicher, "Think Global, Act Local": Employee Representation in a World
of Global Labor and Product Market Competition, Paper presented at the Governing the
Global Workplace Conference, Minneapolis, Minn. (Apr. 16, 2005) (on file with author).
105. BEVERLY J. SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR:
GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870, at 131-38, 176-77 (2003).
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* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law.
106. Portions of this presentation are based on research from a prior article: Michelle A.
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protection of one particular group of atypical workers: those who are
unable to meet what I refer to as the "full-time face-time norm." I use
this term to describe the set of default organizational preferences that
many employers have for designing the workplace around full-time
positions, requiring unlimited hours or rigid work schedules,
demanding that work be performed at a central work location, and
requiring an uninterrupted worklife by imposing severe consequences
on employees who take time out of the paid labor force. It is not
difficult to identify various types of workers who will be unable to
meet this norm. Essentially, this norm affects anyone who needs to
work part-time or flex-time, to job share, to telecommute, or
periodically to exit the paid labor force.
One large category of workers that fits this description is made
up of individuals who have significant caregiving responsibilities.
Because women still perform the majority of carework,' 7 this
category is made up disproportionately of women, who therefore
disproportionately are denied jobs and career advancement by the
full-time face-time norm. Two-thirds of mothers work less than forty
hours per week during the coinciding years of early childrearing and
critical career development,o which means that a full-time job design
excludes the majority of mothers from the job.
I plan to focus particularly on this category of atypical workers
women with significant caregiving responsibilities - in part because
existing law still has some potential for protecting this group without
the need for new legislation. Moreover, if this potential is realized, it
may provide important spillover effects to help protect male workers
who have or who wish to take on caregiving work, as well as workers
who for other reasons are unable (or unwilling) to provide an
unlimited, uninterrupted worklife.
The full-time face-time norm is a remnant of the late Eighteenth
and early Nineteenth Century shift to a commercial and industrial
economy.10 That transition resulted in a new separation of "work"
from "home," both geographically (i.e., physically) and temporally.
Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potentialof Employment DiscriminationLaw, 62 WASH.
&

& LEE L. REV. 3 (2005) [hereinafter Travis, Recapturing].
107. See Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. LAB.

EMP. L. 283, 299 (2003) [hereinafter Travis, Equality].
108. See JOAN WILLIAMS ET AL., ENDING
CAREGIVERS 3

1

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FAMILY
3 (2004), available at <http://www.uchastings.edu/site_ files/WLL/Caregiver

DiscriminationReport.pdf>.
109. For a more complete history of the development of the full-time face-time norm, see
Travis, Recapturing,supra note 106, at 10-12.
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At that time, the newly separated spheres of work and home required
a change from the patriarchal regime that governed the previously
integrated working home. The home became the women's sphere and
the market became the men's sphere. Employers, in turn, designed
their new workplaces around that particular social order. More
specifically, employers designed their new workplaces around the
typical workers of the time: predominantly men who had no
household or caregiving responsibilities and who had a free flow of
domestic work from their wives. In other words, employers designed
their new workplaces around the full-time face-time norm because
most workers indeed could provide uninterrupted full-time face-time.
The problem is that this particular workplace design has outlived
the typical worker around whom it was designed. Despite the great
influx of women into the workforce and the rise in single-parent and
dual-earner families, and despite growing economic evidence that
workplace flexibility is good for the bottom line, many employers still
use full-time face-time as the default way of structuring the workplace
for both top-level white-collar and blue-collar jobs. I have
hypothesized elsewhere on the reasons for the remarkable resilience
of the full-time face-time norm,"' but regardless of the cause, it is
clear that even though there have been dramatic changes in the work
relationship (which the other panelists have discussed), this particular
aspect of the workplace is still quite well entrenched. Providing legal
protection to this particular group of atypical workers - women with
caregiving responsibilities who cannot meet the full-time face-time
norm - therefore will require not just rethinking who the "typical
worker" is, but also challenging what the "typical workplace" should
look like.
One way to do this with existing law is to conceptualize the fulltime face-time norm as a form of discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' In particular, it is possible to use the
disparate impact theory of discrimination as a tool to redesign the
exclusionary workplace policies that employers use to implement this
norm. Under the basic disparate impact model, an employer's use of a
facially neutral "particular employment practice" constitutes
discrimination if it causes a disproportionately negative effect on a
protected group of workers, unless the employer can prove that the
110. See id. at 12-20.
111. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (2000)).
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practice is "job related" and "consistent with business necessity."112
In theory, this disparate impact model should be available to
protect women workers with caregiving responsibilities. These
women may argue that employment policies implementing various
aspects of the full-time face-time norm constitute facially neutral
particular employment practices that cause a disproportionately
negative effect on women because women still perform the majority
of caregiving work and therefore have a more difficult time meeting
full-time face-time demands. If this argument succeeds, employers
would be required to eliminate the offending practices and replace
them with practices providing greater workplace flexibility - for
example, part-time, flex-time, or job-sharing positions, or the option
to telecommute from home. Employers could retain their full-time
face-time practices only by affirmatively proving that the practices are
job related and consistent with business necessity - for example, by
showing that a particular job must be done in a single full-time
position rather than in two part-time positions or through a jobsharing arrangement, or by showing that a particular job must be
performed at a central work location rather than from home.
While many legal academics have shown renewed interest in
using the disparate impact theory to address structural and
organizational barriers to equality,113 skepticism regarding the
potential power of disparate impact claims remains strong." 4
However, looking at the experience of workers in the United
Kingdom provides one source of hope for the disparate impact
revivalists. Since the mid-1980s, women in the United Kingdom
successfully have used disparate impact claims (which are referred to
as "indirect discrimination" claims) for precisely the purpose that I
have described: to challenge policies implementing the full-time face-

112. Id. § 2000e-2(k).
113. See, e.g., Camille H6bert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive
Matter?, 53 KAN. L. REV. 341 (2005); Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in
Employment Discrimination:What's Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597
(2004); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 911 (2005); Travis, Recapturing, supra note 106, at 36-46, 77-91;
Travis, Equality, supra note 107, at 341-74; Charles A. Sullivan, Re-reviving Disparate Impact
(Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 9, 2004), available at <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=581503>.
114. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
AntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2006); see also Travis, Equality, supra note
107, at 321 n.212 (listing authors who have questioned antidiscrimination law's potential to
restructure workplace organizational norms).
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time norm as a form of discrimination against women."' When
litigating these cases, British lawyers often cite our Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.116 case as the basis for their argument.' Using disparate
impact claims to require employers to provide greater workplace
flexibility has become so well accepted in the United Kingdom that
the website for the Equal Opportunities Commission (the United
Kingdom's partial rough equivalent to our Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission) now includes an entire section devoted to
this use."'
In the United Kingdom, courts have struck down a wide range of
full-time face-time practices as having a disproportionately negative
effect on women because of women's disproportionate caregiving
responsibilities." 9 Women successfully have challenged policies that
treat part-time workers less favorably than full-time workers, as well
as policies that refuse part-time or job-sharing options altogether. 2 0
Women successfully have challenged policies setting rigid start and
stop times, imposing mandatory overtime, or requiring double or
rotating shifts. 2' And women successfully have challenged an
employer's refusal to provide telecommuting arrangements.'22
Of course, employers in the United Kingdom have the
opportunity to defend their full-time face-time practices by making a
showing similar to the business necessity defense under Title VII.1 23
Courts in the United Kingdom generally have taken the employer's
1

115. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 106, at 83; see also EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES

COMMISSION, at <http://www.eoc.org.uk/Default.aspx?page=15301&lang=en> (last viewed Mar.
20, 2006) (summarizing case decisions from the United Kingdom's Employment Tribunal, Court
of Appeal, and European Court of Justice involving women workers' use of the United
Kingdom's Sex Discrimination Act to obtain "family friendly working").
116. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
117. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd. [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 24, 26 (E.C.J.);
see also Travis, Recapturing,supra note 106, at 82-83.
118. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION,

at <http://www.eoc.org.uk/Default.aspx

?page=15303&lang=en> (last viewed Mar. 20, 2006).
119. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, at <http://www.eoc.org.uk/Default.aspx?

page=15301&lang=en> (last viewed Mar. 20, 2006) (summarizing the relevant case decisions
from the United Kingdom's Employment Tribunal, Court of Appeal, and European Court of
Justice involving women workers' use of the United Kingdom's Sex Discrimination Act to
obtain "family friendly working").
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, at <http://www.eoc.org.uk/Default.aspx?

page=15302&lang=en> (last viewed Mar. 20 2006) (explaining that "it is for the employer to
show that it is genuinely necessary for the job to be done on a full-time basis, during specific
hours or to a specific shift pattern, in order to meet a legitimate business need").
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burden seriously and required employers to provide concrete,
objective evidence to raise this defense.124 Typically, courts have
found it insufficient for an employer simply to allege that providing
equitable workplace flexibility would cause increased administrative
or technological costs, lack of continuity with customers or clients,
greater difficulties supervising workers, or negative effects on team
spirit or co-worker morale.'25 Nor has it been sufficient for an
employer to allege that providing workplace flexibility to some
workers would result in a flood of others demanding similarly flexible
work arrangements.'26
Although employers in the United Kingdom sometimes are able
to meet their burden and retain their full-time face-time practices,12 7
the significance of these cases is the courts' willingness to apply the
disparate impact theory in the first place. By applying the disparate
impact theory to employment policies that implement the full-time
face-time norm, courts effectively have done away with the
presumption that a "typical workplace" exists. Rather, the
presumption in the United Kingdom has become that when, where,
and how tasks get performed are all malleable choices that an
employer can and should adapt to fit a wide range of different
workers, unless the employer can prove a strong reason otherwise.
Of course, this particular use of the disparate impact theory in
the United Kingdom directly protects only women. By definition, it is
an allegation of discrimination on the basis of sex. However, these
claims indirectly can provide spillover protection to other workers as
well. As a remedy for a disparate impact claim, courts may require an
employer to eliminate an offending practice altogether, and to replace
it with a less discriminatory alternative.1 28 This distinguishes disparate
impact claims from similar claims for workplace flexibility by disabled
workers seeking accommodation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of

1990,129

which only requires an employer to modify

124. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, at <http://www.eoc.org.uk/Default.aspx?
page=15301&lang=en> (last viewed Mar. 20, 2006) (summarizing "family friendly working"
cases that have ruled on whether an employer has justified existing practices on business
grounds).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Travis, Recapturing, supra note 106, at 38, 88; Travis, Equality, supra note 107, at

329-30, 373-74.
129. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101117 (2000)).
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a workplace practice for the particular plaintiff in the case.130 In
contrast, successful use of the disparate impact theory to challenge
full-time face-time practices as a form of discrimination against
women can result in employers designing equitable part-time, flextime, job-sharing, and telecommuting options for all of their workers.
That would enable men who have or who want to take on significant
caregiving responsibilities, or workers who are unable to meet fulltime face-time demands for other reasons, to benefit indirectly from
the results of women's successful disparate impact claims.
In the United Kingdom, employers who have refused to provide
flexible work arrangements to men have faced straightforward claims
of disparate treatment (referred to as "direct discrimination"
claims)."' In other words, litigation first required employers in the
United Kingdom to provide flexible work arrangements to women to
avoid disparate impact claims alleging that inflexible practices that
are neutrally applied disproportionately affect women. In turn,
employers were prompted to provide equivalent flexible work
arrangements to men to avoid disparate treatment claims alleging
differential treatment of women and men.
The next logical question is why the successful use of disparate
impact claims in this context in the United Kingdom has not yet been
realized in the United States. In prior conversations, British lawyers
with whom I have spoken have had a difficult time understanding
why the results of their workplace flexibility cases do not flow
inevitably from Griggs.13 Often, they have speculated that the United
States must have a lower standard for an employer's business
necessity defense. While I believe that is correct, unfortunately it is
not the only potential barrier to litigating similar cases in our courts.
Judicial resistance to this particular use of the disparate impact theory
reveals itself at a much more fundamental level.
Many judges in the United States have become so convinced that
the full-time face-time norm is an immutable workplace characteristic
that they have held that employer policies implementing the full-time
2

130. See Travis, Recapturing,supra note 106, at 38, 88 (explaining the different remedies in a
Title VII disparate impact case and an ADA accommodation case); Travis, Equality, supra note

107, at 329-30, 373-74 (same).
131. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, at <http://www.eoc.org.uk/Default.aspx?

page=15301&lang=en>

(last viewed Mar. 20 2006)

(explaining that men may claim

discrimination if an employer provides workplace flexibility only to women, such as when
"women in the organisation are allowed to job share, but men are not" and describing a
successful direct discrimination case by a male worker requesting a flexible work arrangement).

132. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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face-time norm do not constitute "practices" at all, but instead
constitute actual job tasks."' These courts mistakenly have equated
employer choices about the malleable organization of when, where,
and how tasks are performed with the underlying tasks themselves.
By defining away the relevant "practices" in this manner, there
remains nothing against which a plaintiff may lodge her disparate
impact complaint.
The Seventh Circuit case of Dormeyer v. Comerica BankIllinois 3 4 illustrates this approach. Dormeyer was a clerical worker

who had periods of absence due to pregnancies.13 5 Her employer had
implemented the full-time face-time norm by imposing a very rigid
work schedule and a no-absence policy. 36 After experiencing negative
career consequences for her inability to meet these policies,
Dormeyer brought a disparate impact claim. 13 7 She alleged that the
rigid work schedule and no-absence policy were facially neutral
particular employment practices that had a disparate impact on
women, and she sought a flexible hour arrangement as a less
discriminatory alternative practice.' 8 The Seventh Circuit rejected her
claim.3 9 The court characterized the rigid work schedule and noabsence policy not as employment "practices," but rather as
"legitimate requirements of the job."140 In so doing, the court equated
the employer's choice of how to organize when, where, and how
workers perform job tasks with the actual job tasks themselves. The
court assumed that the full-time face-time norm was an essential
defining element of the job, and it did so based merely on the fact
that the job had always been structured in that manner, and because
the employer's job description said so. Without a particular "practice"
to point to, Dormeyer was left without any foundation for her
disparate impact claim.
The fairly typical result in the Dormeyer case reveals how
strongly entrenched the assumption of a "typical workplace" really is
in the United States. However, there have been a few successes in
133. See Travis, Recapturing, supranote 106, at 36-46 (summarizing relevant cases).
134. 223 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Travis, Recapturing, supra note 106, at 40-41
(analyzing the Dorrneyercase).
135. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 581-84.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 581, 585 (affirming the dismissal of Dormeyer's complaint on summary
judgment).
140. Id. at 583-84.
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United States courts using disparate impact cases to create workplace
flexibility,14' so the story is not uniformly bleak. Nevertheless, even if
successful disparate impact claims become the norm, rather than the
exception, there are still inherent limitations with using this theory.
Title VII only covers employers that have fifteen or more employees
for a designated time period, 42 and it only protects employees,143 who
are becoming a smaller subset of the working population. The parallel
employment discrimination law in the United Kingdom, in contrast,
covers small employers and protects employees, partners, and
independent contractors.'" This means that successful disparate
impact litigation in the United States will, by definition, always end
up having a narrower reach than in the United Kingdom.
Given the current record of disparate impact litigation in the
United States and the inherent limits in Title VII's application, one
might wonder why it is worth pursuing a strategy of pressing the
boundaries of the disparate impact theory as a way to protect women
workers with caregiving responsibilities. If the inflexibility of
workplaces designed around the full-time face-time norm is indeed an
obstacle to employment success, why not advocate instead a strategy
of enacting legislation that directly mandates workplace flexibility?
The experience in the United Kingdom provides potential
insights. One lesson that might be learned from the United Kingdom
experience is that pressing the boundaries of existing law through
litigation to protect certain workers can be an effective interim step
toward eventually enacting new, more directly protective legislation.
In the United Kingdom, it appears that disparate impact litigation
was not seen as the final solution for protecting workers who require
workplace flexibility. The ultimate objective in the United Kingdom
was to enact legislation directly governing workplace flexibility. That
objective, however, did not appear to be feasible until some of the
basic assumptions about the existing workplace had been sufficiently
disrupted - which was perhaps the most important effect of successful
disparate impact claims.
In addition, the United Kingdom's experience demonstrates that
disparate impact litigation does not have to be widely successful to

141. See Travis, Recapturing,supra note 106, at 84-86 (summarizing relevant cases).

142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
143. See id. § 2000e(f).
144. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, at <http://www.eoc.org.uk/Default.aspx?

page=15302&lang=en#1417> (last viewed Mar. 20, 2006).
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play this interim role toward changing institutional practices and
ultimately enacting new legislation. All that is needed are a few
widely publicized successes, as illustrated by the highly effective
educational campaign played by the United Kingdom's Equal
Opportunities Commission. It takes only a few prominent cases to
start undermining the assumption that the existing workplace design
is immutable. It takes only a few prominent cases to start
disentangling the identification of work tasks from an employer's
choice about how to organize when, where, and how those tasks are
performed. And it takes only a few prominent cases to start
highlighting that employers often have little or no business
justification for retaining policies implementing the full-time facetime norm.
Although disparate impact claims are still alive and well in the
United Kingdom, they have now been eclipsed by claims brought
directly under various workplace flexibility statutes that were enacted
on the heels of disparate impact's success. One of the most significant
pieces of legislation in the United Kingdom is the Employment Act
200214' and its related Flexible Working Regulations. 6 This Act
provides both men and women workers who meet certain criteria147
with the right to request a change in the number of hours that they
work, in the times that they work, or in the location where they
work.'" In other words, workers have the right to request part-time or
job-sharing options, non-traditional start or stop times, or the ability
to telecommute from home, and employers may not retaliate against
them for making such a request.149
One of the interesting aspects of this "right to request" law is
that it protects workers largely by providing a right to process, rather
14

145. Employment Act 2002, c. 22, § 47, available at <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts
2002/20020022.htm> (adding § 8A to the Employment Rights Act 1996, available at
<http://www.emplaw.co.uk/load/4frame/era96/list.htm.>).
146. The Flexible Working (Eligibility, Complaints and Remedies) Regulations 2002, S.I.
3236 (U.K.), available at <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20023236.htm>; The Flexible
Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002, S.I. 3207 (U.K.), available at
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/silsi2002/20023207.htm>.
147. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, at <http://www.eoc.org.uk/Default.aspx?

page=15302&lang=en#1593> (last viewed Mar. 20, 2006) (explaining that to be eligible to
request flexible work arrangements under the Employment Rights Act 1996, as amended by the
Employment Act 2002, a worker must have a child under age six or a disabled child under age
eighteen and have worked for the employer continuously for twenty-six weeks).
148. Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, §80F(1) (as amended by the Employment Act
2002), available at <http://www.emplaw.co.uk/load/4frame/era96/era9680F.htm>.
149. The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002, S.I. 3207, art. 16,
available at <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20023207.htm>.
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than a right to a particular outcome.5 oThe Act requires employers to
respond to a worker's request for workplace flexibility within twentyeight days, either by granting the request or by setting up a meeting to
discuss the request with the worker."' The employer must notify the
worker of its final decision within fourteen days of the meeting. If
the employer denies the worker's request for workplace flexibility,
the employer must provide a written response that identifies one or
more reasons from a specific list of reasons enumerated in the
statute.153 Statutorily-permissible reasons for denying a worker's
request for workplace flexibility include, for example, that the
worker's request would make the employer unable to meet customer
demands, or that there would be insufficient work available during
the hours that the worker wishes to work. 54 Under the Act, a worker
may appeal a denial internally to the employer within fourteen days
of receiving the employer's final response." The employer is required
to hold a meeting with the worker to discuss the appeal and to
provide a written response to the appeal within fourteen days of the
meeting.'5 6 A worker may bring either a union representative or a
trusted colleague to all meetings."' Ultimately, the Act allows the
51 2

150. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an
Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers
(manuscript on file with author) (providing a thorough defense of an "organizational justice
approach" in which legislation mandates judicially enforceable private due process rights that
give workers a voice in the workplace and encourage employers to voluntarily accommodate
caregiving).
151. Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(a) (as amended by the Employment Act
2002), available at <http://www.emplaw.co.uk/load/4frame/era96/era9680F.htm>; The Flexible
Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002, S.I. 3207, art. 3, available at <http://

www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20023207.htm>.
152. Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(b) (as amended by the Employment Act
2002), available at <http://www.emplaw.co.uk/load/4frame/era96/era9680F.htm>; The Flexible
Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002, S.I. 3207, art. 4, available at <http://

www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20023207.htm>.
153. Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(c) (as amended by the Employment Act
2002), available at < http://www.emplaw.co.uk/load/4frame/era96/era9680F.htm >; The Flexible
Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002, S.I. 3207, art. 5, available at <http://

www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20023207.htm>.
154. Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, § 80G(1)(b) (as amended by the Employment Act
2002), availableat < http://www.emplaw.co.uk/load/4frame/era96/era9680F.htm

>.

155. Id. § 80G(2)(d); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002,
S.I. 3207, art. 6, availableat <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20023207.htm>.
156. Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, §§ 80G(2)(g)-(h) (as amended by the Employment
Act

2002),

available at <http://www.emplaw.co.uk/1oad/4frame/era96/era9680F.htm>;

The

Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002, S.I. 3207, arts. 8-10, availableat
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20023207.htm>.
157. Employment Rights Act 1996, c.18, § 80G(2)(k) (as amended by the Employment Act
2002), available at < http://www.emplaw.co.uk/load/4frame/era96/era9680F.htm>; The Flexible
Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002, S.I. 3207, art. 14, available at
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worker to appeal an employer's decision to an outside tribunal, if the
worker believes that the employer failed to follow the statutory
procedure or that the employer's denial of a workplace flexibility
request was not based on one of the statutorily-specified reasons or
was based on incorrect facts. 8
This shift in codifying rights in terms of process, rather than
substantive outcomes, is a promising method of providing workers
with an internal voice in the workplace. Not only might this be a more
politically viable approach to drafting new legislation in the United
States, but it also may be quite effective in protecting workers. This
approach is similar to the "interactive process" mandated by the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which requires employers to
meet with disabled employees who request workplace changes and to
discuss potential accommodations.159 In my experience as a former
provided
many
employers
willingly
employment
lawyer,
accommodations that went well beyond what was legally required by
the ADA (for example, by giving accommodations to workers who
would not have met the statutory definition of a disabled employee)
as a result of the interactive process. By establishing an
institutionalized forum for employers and workers to discuss potential
workplace changes, the ADA provides a means for employers to
discover that there often are no significant financial, administrative,
or practical downsides to modifying workplace practices as workers
desire.
In summary, there are two general lessons that may be learned
from the United Kingdom's experience regarding the legal protection
of one particular group of atypical workers: those who are atypical
because they cannot meet the full-time face-time norm. First, any
move to protect these workers necessarily will require a legal strategy
that challenges assumptions not just about who the "typical worker"
is, but also assumptions about what is and is not a "typical
workplace." Second, one possible legal strategy to consider is the twostep process of litigating the boundaries of existing law to help disrupt
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20023207.htm>.
158. Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, § 80H(1) (as amended by the Employment Act
2002), available at <http://www.emplaw.co.uk/load/4frame/era96/era9680F.htm.>; The Flexible
Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002, S.I. 3207, art. 15, available at
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20023207.htm>.
159. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2001); see also Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105,
1111-16 (9th Cir. 2000) (characterizing the interactive process as "mandatory" and describing
the process in detail), rev'd in part on other grounds, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391
(2002).
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basic assumptions, followed by a move toward process-based
legislation that implements long-term institutional changes.
Protecting atypical workers does not necessarily require a choice
between litigation and legislation alternatives, as the two may work
together to produce the most effective overall results.
Professor Katherine V. W. Stone: I want to thank all of the
speakers for their thoughtful and fascinating talks. I would like to
make a couple of short remarks that might bring together some of
things that have been said. The theme of all of our speakers is the
idea of "fair flexibility." That is a term that George has offered to
help us think about the kinds of regulatory proposals that we want to
begin to devise. Michelle's suggestion that we look to the U.K. and
some of the other developments in Europe, around disparate impact
or employment discrimination, is very constructive. However, in the
American context, there is a problem. The more you require
employers to develop flexibility in terms of working time and place,
the more workers are going to fall into the regulatory black hole that
Steve discussed. That is, the further employees are located from the
workplace itself and the particular oversight of the employer, then the
more they look like independent contractors. So we have a problem
under U.S. law which does not really exist in the U.K. where there is a
more expansive definition of who is a worker in the first place.
Therefore, the changes in the definition of the employee that Steve
talked about are things that are central. If we are going to try to push
the boundaries of this full-time face-time norm, we also have to think
about how to provide protections for people in these new settings.
This panel has provided an excellent overview of the challenge of
expanding the scope of employment protections to new kinds of
workers. I want to put one more idea on the table. One of the
hallmarks of today's new flexible labor market is that not only do
people change jobs frequently, but they have to change the kinds of
work they do and they have to change their skills constantly
throughout their working careers. They cannot rely on one set of
skills that they attained in their high school or their college years to
carry them through, but rather they need training and retraining
throughout their careers. That is a kind of safety net that we need to
add to when we think about labor and employment protection. We
need to think about training and retraining rights as well as various
kinds of transition rights and expanding the net of protection. One
proposal I want to put on the table is what we might call a "workplace
sabbatical," in which people who are in a working relationship have a
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break for the purpose of retraining. Such a program would enable
people to have time to get new skills as they move around in this
flexible labor market that is really the labor market that people face
today.
So, I want to add this concept to our set of policy or regulatory
proposals that we are starting to explore.

